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of aggregate output mimics that of a model with fully flexible prices. While this “neutrality” result is
special, the “comovement problem”  n the perverse response of flexibly priced durables to monetary
policy shocks  n is highly robust. When some durables prices are flexible and others sticky, the
comovement problem still applies strongly to the subset of durables with flexible prices. We argue that
new housing construction might be best characterized as a flexible price industry for which the
comovement problem is relevant. The underlying reason for the comovement problem is the
combination of a naturally high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the purchases of durables and
temporarily low marginal costs associated with economic contractions.
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    Modern theories of the monetary business cycle typically attribute central 
importance to nominal rigidities. Much of our understanding of the behavior of sticky-
price models has come from one-sector models with symmetric firms using identical 
price-setting rules.  In realistic economies, however, not all prices are equally sticky.   
For instance, the price of a bottle of Coca Cola was stuck at five
 cents for a period of 70 
years.
1 At the other extreme, the prices of many agricultural commodities vary daily.   
We will make the case that the pricing of newly constructed housing is better 
characterized as flexible than as sticky in the sense required for/by the logic of the 
modern sticky price model.   
In addition to restricting their attention to models in which all prices are equally 
sticky, a surprising fraction of researchers focus on the behavior of nondurables alone.  
Yet in actual data, fluctuations in the production of durable goods are a prominent feature 
of the response to monetary shocks.  For example, in the data, housing production falls 
sharply following a monetary contraction, while the production of nondurables falls very 
little. 
                                                 
1 See Levy and Young [2002]   2
This paper studies the equilibrium implications of the interaction between the 
degree of durability and the degree of price flexibility in a sector.  In particular, we ask 
whether sticky price models can have sectors with flexible prices and still match the main 
features of the data. We analyze a model with both sticky price and flexible price sectors, 
and with both durable and nondurable goods. We find that it is not sufficient to specify 
how large the sticky price sector is relative to the flexible price sector; it matters crucially 
which sectors have sticky prices.   
In particular, neoclassical sticky price models exhibit surprising behavior when 
augmented with durable goods with flexible prices.  In these models there is a strong 
tendency for production of flexibly priced durables to expand during periods of tight 
money and contract during periods of monetary expansion.  In an instructive special case 
in which the only sticky prices are those of nondurables, the negative comovement of 
durables and nondurables output entails exactly offsetting effects, and the behavior of 
aggregate output in the model is very similar to that of a model with fully flexible prices.  
While this neutrality result requires special circumstances, the perverse response of 
flexibly priced durables to monetary policy is highly robust. 
What is special about durables?  Purchases of nondurables are subject to the 
consumption smoothing logic of the permanent income hypothesis. As a result, there is 
relatively little room for consumers to substitute intertemporally in response to a change 
in the relative price of nondurables.  On the other hand, the stock – and the associated 
shadow value – of durables is nearly constant over the modest horizon for which 
monetary disturbances might have real effects; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
for purchases of durables is nearly infinite. The result is that a small, temporary increase 
in the relative price of durables causes a large shift of expenditure away from that sector.
2  
Monetary expansions increase spending at constant prices, and typically result in 
increased output, increased factor demands, and higher marginal costs of production.  To 
the extent that monetary expansions increase output and employment in equilibrium, the 
period following such an expansion is an expensive time to produce. While the markups 
on goods with sticky prices are squeezed below their desired levels, for producers in 
                                                 
2 We have not formally studied the case of storable, though nondurable, consumption goods. It appears that 
at least some of the logic of this argument carries over to that case.     3
flexible price sectors, the increase in factor prices is merely an adverse cost shock. Unless 
there is an offsetting endogenous increase in demand, flexible price sectors will contract. 
We show that there is little hope of generating such an increase in the demand for 
durables as a consequence of monetary expansion.  This scenario contrasts sharply with 
the conventional view of durables in informal Keynesian models.  Those models posit 
powerful forces that cause demand for durables to rise sharply following a monetary 
expansion, more than offsetting any contractionary effects of increased factor prices.  
The mechanism that leads to the contrarian behavior of the durables sector in our 
scenario is a manifestation of a more general comovement problem discussed by Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1989]. In multi-sector general equilibrium models, shocks that 
cause an expansion in one sector have a tendency to cause contractions in other sectors.  
For example, in a real business cycle model, temporary favorable technology shocks in 
the consumption sector also cause a contraction in the durables sector and tend not to 
raise aggregate output.  The logic is essentially the same; temporary technology shocks 
are analogous to the temporary deviations in the markup (or “real marginal cost”) in the 
sticky price model. 
Our most important result is that if any long-lived durable has flexible prices, 
otherwise standard neoclassical sticky-price models generate negative comovement for 
that sector.  This result is interesting regardless of its empirical relevance because it 
reveals the powerful implications of the inclusion of durables in dynamic models. 
Nevertheless, this line of inquiry is of even more compelling interest if there in fact exist 
economically significant long-lived durables that have flexible prices.  We argue that 
housing is such a good.   There is no question that residential housing is very durable - 
the stock/flow ratio is roughly 55 to 1.
3  It is unlikely that contractors commit to prices 
prior to construction, suggesting that prices are not sticky at the critical point where the 
quantity of construction is decided.   Finally, residential investment is a significant and 
volatile component of GDP. Fluctuations in residential investment account for 18.3% of 
the fluctuations in GDP. In comparison, the production of nonresidential structures, 
                                                 
3 There are roughly 72 million owner occupied houses in the U.S. In 2000, there were 1.3 million housing 
starts of 1-4 unit dwellings.   4
equipment and software, and changes in inventories account for 5.95%, 15.77% and 
16.92% of GDP fluctuations respectively.
4    
In fact, there are good reasons to believe that many durables have prices that are 
relatively flexible. First, as we demonstrate in the next section of this paper, the price of 
durables relative to that of nondurables falls in response to monetary contractions. 
Following a Romer date, the price of new houses falls by almost 10% relative to the CPI 
for nondurables. Automobile prices and the CPI for durable goods fall by roughly 5% 
relative to the CPI for nondurables. Second, although it is well known that CPI inflation 
is positively serially correlated (“inflation persistence”), the degree of serial correlation is 
not equal across goods. Interestingly, the prices of new houses, in particular, do not 
exhibit any inflation persistence.  Inflation in the median price of new housing displays 
negative serial correlation, indicating that these prices jump and indeed tend to overshoot.  
In addition to these empirical findings, there are conceptual reasons to expect the 
transaction prices of many durables to be effectively flexible.  One difference between 
durables and nondurables is that durable goods are relatively expensive on a per-unit 
basis.  If the explicit and implicit costs of negotiation have an important fixed component, 
there is more incentive to negotiate on the price of a durable good (see also Leahy 
[1995])
5. Some durables are priced for the first time when they are sold.   Other large 
durables often require considerable customization; this necessitates negotiations, and the 
discussions about the exact nature of the good are likely to be accompanied by 
negotiations about price. Zabracki, et al. [2002] present evidence obtained “in the field” 
on negotiations between large business customers and sales representatives of a large 
supplier of industrial durables.  They show that salesmen do in fact have (and exercise) 
considerable leeway to offer “deals” to major customers who express dissatisfaction with 
increases in list price.  
  Previous papers that have studied models with flexible and sticky price sectors 
include Blinder and Mankiw [1984], Ohanian and Stockman [1994], Ohanian, Stockman, 
and Kilian [1995], and Bils, Klenow and Kryvstov [2003]. Only Ohanian et al. [1995] 
                                                 
4 In 2000, residential investment accounted for 412 billion dollars – roughly 4% of GDP. The standard 
deviation of employment in construction relative to trend is 3.75% compared with 1.47% for aggregate 
employment. The corresponding volatility for residential investment production is 10% compared with 
1.66% for GDP.  
5 This logic, however, does apply as well to nondurables that are sold to retailers in large lots.     5
includes a durables sector. The simulations Ohanian et. al  present illustrate the 
comovement and neutrality problems we discuss below, but without a full explanation.  
The comment on Ohanian et al. by Leahy [1995] hints at some of the logic behind these 
effects, but leaves several questions unanswered—particularly why the overall output 
effect is so close to zero.  Ohanian and Stockman [1994] allow for a variable 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution across two nondurable sectors.  As we emphasize 
later, the naturally high intertemporal elasticity of substitution in durable goods spending 
plays a central role in our paper, and thus some of the economics in this paper parallels 
that in Ohanian and Stockman [1994]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we present 
empirical results pertaining to durable goods sectors, paying particular attention to the 
housing industry. We first document that both the production and the relative price of 
durables fall sharply after a monetary contraction. We also show that the persistence of 
inflation rates differs sharply across industries. These empirical facts set the stage for our 
analysis of the sticky price mechanism in environments with flexibly priced durables. 
Section 3 presents the basic framework used in the analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present the 
two main puzzles in our paper: the robust comovement problems in the durable goods 
sectors and the potential for monetary neutrality even in models with significant nominal 
rigidity. Section 6 presents simulations of the model. Section 7 discusses possible 
resolutions to the comovement problem. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Durable Goods and Monetary Disturbances: Stylized Facts  
The fundamental theme of this paper is the tension between theory and data with 
respect to the behavior of durable goods markets following a monetary policy 
disturbance. In this section, we examine time series evidence on the prices and outputs of 
several categories of durables in the periods surrounding contractionary shifts in 
monetary policy. We confirm the conventional wisdom that the production of durables 
falls dramatically in response to a tightening of monetary policy. We then show that 
durable goods prices fall relative to the prices of nondurables following monetary 
contractions.  A related finding is that inflation persistence differs significantly across   6
sectors.  Most notably, the prices of newly constructed houses display no inflation 
persistence at all.      
We focus on the economy’s behavior following a few clear-cut and dramatic 
changes in monetary policy. Specifically, we use Romer dates as indicators of 
pronounced monetary tightness. The advantages of this approach are that our attention is 
drawn to the most drastic changes in monetary policy and that it allows for the possibility 
that the important parts of monetary policy may be systematic.
6 This approach does have 
shortcomings. As Shapiro (1992) demonstrates, these monetary contractions are not 
exogenous. Romer dates tend to occur when inflation is high and rising and 
unemployment is low. The “shocks” we identify are few in number and are not ranked by 
magnitude. Finally, there is reason to believe that the Romer dates come too late to catch 
the inception of monetary tightenings (Bernanke and Mihov, [1998]) – a problem that is 
mitigated, however, by the flexible approach taken below.  
We document the behavior of several economic variables before and after these 
events.
7 For any variable in levels we take the averages of xt+j /xt given that t is a Romer 
date for j = -4, … 16. We compare this series with the averages of xt+j /xt for all dates 
(again for j = -4, … 16). The resulting series give us a window of observation on the 
economy during these episodes. We look before the date itself (i.e. before j = 0) to see the 
events “leading up” to a Romer date. In addition, we suspect that Romer dates may lag 
the actual changes in policy. Bernanke and Mihov [1998] argue that Romer dates occur 
when their index describing the stance of monetary policy (the Bernanke-Mihov index) is 
at a trough, indicating that the actual change in monetary policy was made prior to the 
date.  
Before proceeding to the results we should make a remark concerning the 
interpretation of the “trend” by which we mean the path of the ratios xt+j /xt over the 
                                                 
6 A common approach to the study of monetary policy effects is to examine impulse responses to 
“identified” monetary policy shocks from a structural VAR. This has the advantage that, in the best case, it 
identifies the truly exogenous component of monetary policy. However, by excluding the systematic 
component of monetary policy, structural VARs miss the lion’s share of the variation. The innovations in 
the federal funds rate identified by a VAR may not be monetary policy shocks at all, but rather the result of 
misspecification, omitted variables, or uninterpretable noise. Finally, we suspect important nonlinearities 
that render the results of occasional large interventions particularly potent. For analysis using the VAR 
approach, see Erceg and Levin [2003].  
7 This approach goes back to Burns and Mitchell and was used recently in Doyle and Faust [2001].   7
horizon j = -4, … 16, averaged over all dates. Statistically, this average path is the best 
predictor of the relative size of the variable x, j periods after (or before) an arbitrary date 
t. Economically, this corresponds to the trend growth path. For some variables following 
a Romer date, there is a tendency to fall below “trend” and not recover. This is due to the 
fact that the timing of the Romer dates is endogenous. Typically Romer dates occur when 
the economy is “above trend”. So, when a variable falls relative to its trend growth path, 
some of the response should be interpreted as simple mean reversion.  
Figures 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c show the average behavior of several economic variables 
in the quarters following a Romer date. The figures include bands to indicate one 
standard deviation around the point estimates. One thing to notice immediately is that the 
response of these variables is much more dramatic than responses following “shocks” in 
a VAR. The main reason for this difference is that the “events” we are considering (i.e. 
Romer dates) do not correspond to small “shocks” to a stable monetary policy rule but 
rather represent a fundamental change in monetary policy. In a typical VAR system, a 1% 
shock to the federal funds rate reverts to a “normal” level quickly and induces only mild 
responses in GDP and the components of production. Following a Romer date, the 
federal funds rate continues to increase by roughly 4 points (400 basis points). In fact, the 
rise in the funds rate is more than this when we take into account the fact that interest 
rates were rising before the Romer event (see Figure 1.c).  
In Figure 1.a, we see that following a Romer date, durable goods sectors contract 
very sharply while nondurable goods (and overall GDP) do not. Relative to levels in the 
reference period (the Romer date), housing starts fall by approximately 33%. The trough 
occurs seven quarters after the Romer date. Starts remain more than 20% below the 
reference level for nine quarters (from t+4 until t+12). Real residential investment also 
falls substantially. After nine quarters, residential investment is 22% lower than it was in 
the reference date. Real automobile sales fall by 25% after eight quarters. They remain 
more than 10% below the level in the base date for eight quarters (from t+4 until t+11).
8 
Finally, real durables purchases fall by 12.5% relative to the reference date. The trough 
occurs eight quarters after the event. In contrast, nondurables and GDP as a whole react 
much less dramatically. Real purchases of nondurables rise above trend immediately 
                                                 
8 The point estimate is below 10% again 13 quarters following the shock (but not in quarter 12).    8
following the event (although insignificantly) and fall below “trend” after seven quarters. 
Real GDP does not fall relative to its level in the reference date. Relative to “trend” it 
falls by 6%.
9  
In addition to the large effects on durables spending, monetary policy also has 
significant affects on the relative prices of durables and nondurables. The top four panels 
of Figure 1.b show the average responses of four relative prices following a Romer date. 
The price of new houses relative to the CPI for nondurables falls by 12% in comparison 
to the reference date.
10 The trough occurs nine quarters after the Romer date. The relative 
price of cars (measured as the CPI for new autos relative to the CPI for nondurables) falls 
by more than 6% relative to the base date after five to seven quarters. Note that the 
relative price of cars has been falling over time (as shown by the dashed line) so this drop 
is not as significant. Relative to “trend” the maximum drop is only 5%. The price of 
durables relative to nondurables (both measured by their respective CPIs) falls by 4.8% 
relative to the reference date (again the trend for the relative price of durables is negative; 
relative to the trend growth rate, the drop is only 3.7%).
11  
The bottom two panels focus on the housing market. The left hand side panel 
depicts the evolution of the median house price after the reference date. Although the 
median house price continues to rise, its rate of inflation drops immediately after the base 
date. The right hand side panel shows the average response of lumber prices around a 
Romer date. Because Romer dates occur during periods of high and rising inflation, 
prices of almost all goods rise both before and after the monetary contraction begins. 
Lumber and plywood are notable exceptions. Lumber prices literally fall within one 
quarter of the Romer date. After seven quarters they are 6% below their initial level. 
Since lumber prices contribute to the production cost of houses, this indicates downward 
pressure on the marginal cost of production in construction.  
Figure 1.c shows the unemployment rate, the federal funds rate, the rate of 
inflation and the total level of employment. All of these variables respond according to 
conventional wisdom. The unemployment rate rises by almost 3 percentage points 
                                                 
9 Aggregate employment follows a similar pattern (Figure 1.c).  
10 This number is for the median house price. The number for the average house price is similar.  
11 While impulse responses to monetary shocks in identified VARs show strong responses of quantities of 
durable production and housing production to monetary shocks, they do not exhibit the pronounced 
movement in relative prices. See Erceg and Levin [2003] for instance.    9
following a Romer date. Total employment falls only slightly though it has a much 
slower rate of growth than average. According to our data, the average increase in the 
federal funds rate is almost seven percentage points from four periods before the Romer 
date to seven quarters afterwards. Most of this increase is due to the very sharp increases 
in interest rates in the early 1980s.  
Following a Romer date, inflation continues to rise for six quarters. Recent 
literature emphasizes that the inflation rate, not just the price level, is sticky (see e.g. 
Mankiw and Reis [2001]). Moreover, even sticky price models that allow inflation to 
jump imply serially correlated inflation because price adjustment each period is partial. 
Table 1 reports autocorrelations for several price series. For the overall CPI, for durables 
and to a somewhat lesser extent for nondurables, inflation is highly persistent.
12 By this 
measure, the CPIs for both nondurables and durables display stickiness. Automobiles 
have notably less inflation inertia. However, the most noteworthy feature of this data is 
that housing inflation has no persistence at all. Its first autocorrelation is negative which 
implies that, unlike other prices, housing prices tend to overshoot. Incomplete (partial) 
nominal adjustment implies that prices undershoot. This suggests that house prices may 
be quite flexible. 
To summarize, the production of durables responds significantly to changes in 
monetary policy while the production of nondurables does not. Moreover, the relative 
price of durable goods to nondurable goods appears to fall after a monetary contraction. 
In particular, housing starts fall by more than 30% and the price of new houses relative to 
nondurables falls by roughly 10%. In addition, while there is strong evidence of inflation 
persistence in many price series, there is no inflation persistence in housing prices. 
Housing prices appear to overshoot rather than partially adjust to shocks.  
 
3. Framework 
In this section we consider a dynamic economy with many industries or sectors. 
Some industries produce durable goods while the others produce nondurables. In 
addition, some of the goods have sticky prices while others have flexible prices. We 
                                                 
12 Inflation of durable goods as a whole is more persistent than the inflation of nondurables. Automobiles 
have lower inflation persistence than either nondurable goods or durable goods as a whole.   10
assume that there is at least one industry that produces durables and has flexible prices. In 
the durables sectors, we focus on durable consumption goods instead of productive 
capital in order to emphasize that it is durability that is the key issue and not what the 
good is used for.
13  
For this simple model we treat productive capital as a predetermined fixed factor 
but we allow labor to flow freely across industries. Later we will relax both of these 
assumptions. One consequence of labor mobility is that the nominal wage rate Wt will be 
the same across industries.  Because our focus is on the role of sticky prices in generating 
business cycles, we assume that firms have constant desired markups over their marginal 
costs of production
14. Any deviations from these desired markups must come from 
nominal rigidities; the sticky prices in the final goods markets do all of the work in our 
model.   
 
3.1 Household behavior 
Consumers get utility from both nondurable consumption goods and durable 
consumption goods. We denote a typical durable good as djt and a typical nondurable 
good as cjt. Total utility is time separable and additively separable in labor. 
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t
t jt t t jt t t
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Nt is labor supplied at date t. The additive separability of labor is to some extent 
important for our results.  We will return to this point later. 
Let xjt denote the net purchases of type j goods at time t. The household's nominal budget 
constraint is then simply: 
() 11 1 jt jt t t t t t t t
j
Px WN T i S S −− ≤+ Π + + + − ∑ , 
where Πt are profits returned to the consumer through dividends, Tt are nominal transfers 
net of taxes, St is nominal savings and it is the nominal interest rate. Note that for 
nondurable goods cjt = xjt while for durable goods we have: 
                                                 
13 We discuss productive capital briefly in sections 5 and section 7.  
14 In the model we spell out for the simulations, this will be justified with a C.E.S. (Dixit-Stiglitz) 
preference structure. In general, firms will desire markups that fluctuate with changes in demand. See Bils 
[1989] for a discussion of endogenous markups.    11
( ) j jt jt jt d x d δ − + = − 1 1 . 
We allow for different rates of physical depreciation for different durable goods. 
 
Labor Supply and the Demand for Goods and Services 
Taking prices as given, the consumer chooses xjt and Nt to maximize utility. Let λt 
be the marginal utility of an additional dollar of income at time t and let γ jt be the shadow 
value - the contribution to lifetime utility of an additional unit - of good j. Good j can be 
either a durable good or a nondurable good.  If j is a nondurable, then γ j = MU(cj). If 
instead j is a durable good, its shadow value is:  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
12 1 1 ... jt jt j jt j jt MU d MU d MU d γβ δβ δ ++ =+ − + − +  (3.1) 
i.e.  jt γ is the present value of future marginal service flows of the durable, discounted by 
the subjective rate of time preference and the depreciation rate.  The latter can be thought 
of as an index of durability.  
Purchasing an additional amount of any good results in the following change in 
utility:  
  jt t jt P γ λ − . (3.2) 
If the consumer is maximizing utility, this must be zero. The first order condition for the 
supply of labor (Nt) satisfies v′(Nt) = λt Wt.  Jointly, these first order conditions represent 
the demand for goods and services and the supply of labor.  
Combining (3.2) with the first order condition for labor supply gives a set of 
conditions (one for each good) that relate labor supply to the demand for goods and 
services: 
  () ' t
tj t
jt
W vN P γ  = 

. (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) states that the utility cost of an additional unit of labor must be exactly 
balanced by the benefit of spending the Wt extra dollars on any of the goods in the 
economy. Equations (3.3) and (3.1) turn out to be the key equations in the model.    12
 
Money Demand 




jt jt t x P M . 
Here, M is the nominal money supply (the “velocity” of money is 1). Money is injected 
into the economy through lump sum transfers Tt to the agents (Tt can be negative). Of 
course, money demand might also be related to the nominal interest rate (an “LM curve”) 
or other macroeconomic variables, but this is inessential.  The important feature of 
money demand is that when the money supply increases, firms have incentives to raise 
their prices. 
 
3.2 Firm Behavior 
Firms convert labor input into outputs according to their production functions. 
( ) jt j jt n F x =  
We allow each firm to have a different production function. We assume that each Fj 
satisfies 0 '> j F  and  0 ' ' ≤ j F so that all production has non-increasing returns to scale in 
labor.  The nominal marginal cost of production is the cost of hiring an additional unit of 
a productive input times the number of inputs required to produce an additional unit of 
output.  In this simple case, labor is the input to production; we write MCjt = Wt 
((∂n)/(∂q)) = Wt [MPjt
N]
-1 where MPjt
N is the marginal product of labor.  
We assume that some firms are able to change prices every period, while some 
firms must keep prices fixed for at least one period after a monetary shock.
15  Firms with 
fully flexible prices simply maintain their constant desired markups – for these firms µ jt 
= µ at all times.  In a period of monetary expansion, firms that cannot change their prices 
will have actual  (or ex post) markups that fall below the planned or ex ante level.  
 
4. The Comovement Problem 
                                                 
15 In the simulations, we use a Calvo specification to generate price rigidity. We do not need to take a 
position on the exact form of price stickiness at this point.    13
Consider an expansion in the money supply.  Instead of raising their prices, firms 
with sticky prices increase production, as in standard one-sector sticky price models. 
What about the flexible price firms?  In this section we demonstrate that the behavior of a 
flexible price sector that produces durable goods differs radically from what the standard 
model might lead us to expect.  
Recall equation (3.1) for the shadow value of a durable good:  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
12 1 1 ... jt jt j jt j jt MU d MU d MU d γβ δβ δ ++ =+ − + − +  
The steady state stock/flow ratio is 1/δ  in a static model and 1/(δ  + growth rate) in a 
growing economy.  For a highly durable good, this ratio is by definition high. The 
relatively small fluctuations around the steady state that (in the standard model) constitute 
the business cycle leave the stock of such a highly durable good nearly constant at 
cyclical frequencies.  Presuming for the moment that the marginal utilities above depend 
only on the stock of the durable (an assumption that will be relaxed later in this section), 
we conclude that γ jt will display minimal cyclical movement.   
Consider an industry that produces highly durable goods and sells them at a 
perfectly flexible price.  The acyclicality of the stock - and hence the shadow price - of 
durables leads us to drop the time subscript and treat  jt γ  as roughly constant at some  j γ .  




P tj vN γ ≈ .   The fact that the sector has flexible prices 
means that the price of this good is a constant markup over its marginal cost: Pjt =µ j 
(Wt/MPjt
N ). Combining these expressions (in essence, equating labor supply and labor 
demand) implies that: 







≅  (4.1) 
If aggregate employment rises in response to expansionary monetary policy, then 
v′(Nt) rises, reflecting the fact that workers are being drawn up their labor supply  
curves. To maintain equality, the right hand side of equation (4.1) must also rise. With γ j 
and µ j time-invariant, the marginal product of labor must rise and employment in this 
durables sector falls.  This is a very general result. Employment and output of a long-  14
lived durable industry with flexible prices must move in the opposite direction from 
aggregate employment and output. 
 
 5. Sticky Prices and the Neutrality of Money 
If all durables have flexible prices, production has constant returns to scale, and 
factors can move freely across sectors, then money is neutral with respect to aggregate 
output and employment regardless of the degree of nominal rigidity in the nondurables 
sectors. The percentage change in the aggregate price index (the model’s version of the 
GDP deflator) will be equal to the percentage change in the money supply. This will be 
approximately true regardless of how much price rigidity there is in the nondurable 
sectors and regardless of the ratio of nondurables to durables.  Even if the nondurables 
sectors have very sticky prices and even if there are many more nondurables than 
durables in GDP, money will be approximately neutral.   
 
Labor Inputs Only 
  The simplest way to see the neutrality result is to consider a case in which 
production requires only labor with  xjt = AjNjt in every sector (so that production has 
constant returns to scale). The labor market clearing condition for a durable goods sector 
(d) implies that  
()
N





N = Ad  we have one equation in the one aggregate variable Nt. As 
before, the other terms are constants because of flexible prices and durability. The level 
of employment that solves this equation following a monetary shock is the same as the 
level of employment in the steady state. As a result, aggregate labor will not vary over the 
cycle and money will be neutral.  
 
Mobile Capital  
The neutrality result demonstrated in the previous subsection requires that durable 
goods production is linear in labor. If instead capital is mobile across sectors, then it is no 
longer necessary to make this assumption. A constant marginal product of labor can arise   15
endogenously in equilibrium. Specifically, assume that production in each sector has the 
constant returns to scale production function: 
( ) jt jt jt n k F x , =  
(we assume that F is symmetric across sectors). Because factors can flow freely across 
industries, nominal wages and rental prices will be equal in each sector. In addition, the 
firms will always choose a combination of inputs to minimize their costs (given their 
output decision). Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one, cost 
minimization implies that the capital-to-labor ratios will equalize across all sectors 
regardless of which ones have sticky prices and which have flexible prices. Industries that 
increase production do so by hiring capital and labor in the same proportions as other 
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Finally, returning to the labor market clearing condition in the durable goods sector, we 
have:  














Like all of the other durable goods, the aggregate capital stock does not move much over 
the cycle. Because Kt is a “slow moving” component of the model we can safely treat the 
aggregate capital stock as approximately fixed over business cycle horizons. This gives 
us, again, one equation in aggregate employment (Nt), so that, to a first approximation, 
employment is constant over the cycle and money is neutral. 
 
Discussion 
What is the underlying mechanism generating the comovement and neutrality 
results? Following a monetary expansion, sticky price firms continue to meet demand at 
the fixed price. In terms of utility, the marginal cost of an additional unit of good j is 
() '/
N
tj t vN M P. The incipient increase in output in the sticky price sector increases the   16
demand for labor which, in turn raises v’(Nt) and raises marginal cost. In a more general 
model, as the economy expands, pressure on all input markets (labor markets, markets for 
fuel and raw materials, etc.) rises.  
In the face of rising marginal costs, flexible price firms maintain their markups by 
raising prices. As prices adjust, employment returns to its steady state level. As a result, 
the increase in real marginal costs and real durables prices is inherently temporary.  
Is there a sufficient shift in demand for the flexibly priced product to more than offset the 
contractionary effect of the price increase?  For a sufficiently long-lived durable good, 
the answer is no.  The demand schedule for such a good cannot shift very much in the 
short run because the shadow value of a long-lived durable is largely invariant to cyclical 
deviations from the steady state.
16 The stock of the durable moves slowly, and the 
contribution to lifetime utility of an additional unit of the durable is the sum of flow 
utilities extending into the distant future (see equation (3.1)). Because the demand for 
durables is driven by long run considerations, while the rise in the price of durables is 
temporary, consumers intertemporally substitute and postpone durables purchases. Thus 
the adverse price movement is the dominant effect of the monetary expansion on the 
flexible price durables sector. The neutrality result is an extreme case of the co-
movement problem. In this limiting case, intertemporal substitution for durables 
purchases is essentially infinite, and the durables sector is in equilibrium only when the 
price is precisely equal to its steady state value. 
 
6. Simulations 
In this section we use a computable general equilibrium model to demonstrate our 
results. The model has two sectors: a durable goods sector and a nondurable goods sector. 
Our specification allows the durable to function as either productive capital or as a final 
consumption good. The utility function takes the following form: 
                                                 
16 This approximation works because of an implicit assumption that price adjustment is not extremely slow. 
If price adjustment were sufficiently slow, then the distinction between the long run (which determines the 
shadow value of a durable) and the short run would become blurred.  
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The CES aggregator has the (standard) properties that as the elasticity of substitution ρ  




ψψ , and as ρ  → 0, the utility function becomes Leontief so 
that Ct and Dt are perfect complements. σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and η  is the labor supply elasticity (φ  is simply a scaling parameter). The stock of durable 
goods obeys: 
  () 1 1 tt t DD X δ − =− +  (6.2) 
where Xt is the production of new durable goods. Using the budget constraint, the 
consumer’s optimal choices are governed by an Euler equation: 
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and a labor supply equation:  
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Our specific functional forms imply that these equations are: 
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where Ut is defined as  ( )
11 11 1




−− − =+ . We maintain our simple money 
demand structure from section 3: 
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tt tt t M PC PX =+. (6.7) 
We make assumptions that are standard in the literature on nominal rigidity. 
Specifically, we assume that final goods in each sector are produced from a mix of 
intermediate goods according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators:    18
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We assume that ε  > 1. The final goods producers are competitive while each intermediate 
goods producer enjoys a local monopoly on its product. Free entry into the production of 
final goods implies that:  
  ()
1
 1 1 1
 0
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while the demand for any one intermediate good (s) satisfies: 


























so that ε  is the price elasticity of demand. Because the elasticity of demand is constant in 
this setting, firms with completely flexible prices will choose markups over nominal 
marginal costs that are constant (this markup will be:  1 1
ε
ε µ − => ). 
We assume that the production of intermediate goods in each industry is simply 
linear in employment
17 so that: 
  () ()
c
tt cs A ns =  (6.14) 
  () ()
x
tt x sA n s =  (6.15) 
Because we allow for frictionless labor mobility across sectors, nominal marginal costs in 
either industry are simply MCt = Wt /A, where Wt is the nominal wage.  
We motivate price rigidity with a Calvo price setting mechanism. Specifically, let 
θ  j be the probability that a firm in industry j = X, C cannot reset its price in any one 
                                                 
17 This specification is somewhat unorthodox. We use it because it allows us to have constant returns to 
scale (to illustrate the neutrality result), without having to introduce capital as an additional durable good.    19
period. Thus, in each period, 1-θ  j firms reset their prices while θ j firms have prices that 
are stuck at their levels from the previous period. When a firm gets to set its price, it 
chooses a price that makes its expected average markup over the foreseeable future equal 
to its desired markup (see the appendix for details). As a result, the optimal reset price is 
a weighted average of current marginal costs and future marginal costs. Let z %  denote the 
percentage deviation of a variable z from its steady state value. Then to a first order 
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Note that if there were no price rigidity, θ   = 0 and prices would be proportional to 
marginal costs (the markup would be constant). Using (6.10) and (6.11), the final goods 
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Note that because the Calvo mechanism randomly draws out g firms and allows 
them to change their prices, the aggregate production of durable and nondurable goods 
will satisfy:  
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where  ()
jj
tt Nn s d s =∫  for j = X,C. Equilibrium in the labor market requires:  
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tt t NNN =+ (6.22) 
Finally, we need to specify a process for the money supply. For simplicity we assume 
that the money supply follows a random walk (so that shocks to M are permanent):  
  1 ttt MM ξ − =+ , (6.23) 
where ξ t is a mean zero i.i.d. disturbance.  
 
Parameter Values:   20
  We choose parameter values that are typical for standard business cycle models. 
We set the parameters σ  and η  (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the Frisch 
labor supply elasticity) to 1. We set the annual discount factor (β ) to .98 so that the real 
interest rate is 2% per year. φ  is normalized so that N is 1 in the steady state. We assume 




ψψ . ε  is set so that the desired markup is 10%. We assume that the 
depreciation rate for the durable good is 10% annually.
18 Finally, ψ c and ψ d are chosen so 
that the steady state ratio of consumption to total output is .75. Table 1 summarizes these 






β  (discount rate) 
ρ   (elasticity of sub. betw. durables and nondurables) 
η  (labor supply elasticity) 
σ  (intertemporal elasticity of substitution) 
δ  (depreciation rate) 











The model is solved by log-linear approximation in the neighborhood of the non-
stochastic steady state using the Anderson-Moore (AIM) algorithm.  
                                                 
18 Buildings have depreciation rates that are closer to 5%, vehicles and transportation equipment have 
depreciation rates that are closer to 15%. We use 10% because it is a standard value in the business cycle 
literature (the depreciation rate for equipment and machinery is roughly 8-10%). See Hulten and Wykof 
(1979) and (1981).    21
To give the reader a sense of how a “normal” sticky price model responds to a 
monetary shock, we begin with a standard New Keynesian model in which both the 
durable sector and the nondurable sector have equally sticky prices.  
 
Symmetric Price Rigidity 
In the benchmark model, prices are equally sticky throughout the economy. We 
assume that the half-life of exogenous price rigidity is six months (i.e. for any firm, there 
is a 50% chance that it will be able to reset its price within half a year). For models with 
staggered price setting, this corresponds to one year of fixed prices. A half-life of six 
months requires a continuous time annual Calvo parameter of 2ln(2) = 1.3863, meaning 
that on average firms get to reset prices 1.4 times per year.
19 This is a considerable 
amount of exogenous price rigidity. Bils and Klenow [2002] find that prices of most 
consumer goods are reset, on average, once every four months, which suggests a Calvo 
parameter closer to 3.  
We assume that 75% of total GDP consists of nondurable production. The 
aggregate labor supply elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are both 
set to 1. The depreciation rate for the durable good is 10% annually.  
Figure 2.a shows the impulse response of our benchmark model to a permanent, 
unanticipated 1% increase in the money supply. C is aggregate production (and 
consumption) of the nondurable good and X is the production of the durable; 100 periods 
corresponds to one year. In the figure, as prices adjust, employment and output rise. In 
the first quarter following the shock (the first 25 periods in the figure), total output rises 
by 0.83%.
20 Of course if prices were more rigid the model would generate greater 
responses. For instance, if firms could change prices only once every two years (on 
average) then output would rise by 0.93% in the first quarter. 
  Production of the durable good rises sharply following the shock (3.8% in the first 
quarter) while production of nondurable consumption goods rises by much less. Because 
the stock of durables does not change much over the cycle, production of the durable 
                                                 
19 The probability of a price being stuck for an entire year is .25=exp(-1.3863) . 
20 The plot makes it look like output rises by 1% because it is plotting the first 100
th of a year rather than 
the first quarter. Note that because output is linear in employment, the employment response is also 0.83%. 
For the standard New Keynesian model with productive capital, the same experiment implies that 
employment and output increase by roughly 0.79% and 0.52%, respectively.   22
good can be varied considerably without changing the shadow value of the durable 
significantly. On the other hand, nondurable consumption cannot change without 
significant changes in its marginal utility. Said another way, purchases of the nondurable 




  In fact, the reader may be surprised at how small the change in nondurable 
production is when both durable and nondurable prices are sticky. The reason for this is 
fairly simple. Because prices are equally sticky, the production functions are identical, 
and there is a common labor market for the two sectors, prices will be identical in the 
durable and nondurable sectors. Labor supply satisfies equation (1.3) for each sector. For 
the durable goods sector, this says that v'(Nt) = (Wt/Pt)γdt while for the nondurable 
consumption sector we have v'(Nt) = (Wt/Pt)u'(Ct).  Thus,  '( ) td t uC γ = .  If the stock/flow 
distinction for the durable is strong, then  dt d γγ ≈  which implies that u'(Ct) and Ct are 
approximately constant. Another interesting consequence of the model is that if 
nondurable consumption rises in response to a monetary expansion then the relative price 
of durables (P
x/P
c) must be high. If prices are equally sticky, this ratio is constant and as a 
result consumption is constant.   
  This is a sort of “neutrality” result for nondurable goods. With additively separable 
utility, the presence of durables means that no matter how sticky the nondurable prices 
are, their production won't change. This contrasts with the results in a model without 
durables, shown for purposes of comparison in Figure 2.b.  Sticky price theories of the 
business cycle are entirely consistent with very sticky Coca Cola prices and the observation 
that Coca Cola does not respond to monetary policy. As long as durable goods have sticky 
prices, the fact that there are nondurables with sticky prices that don’t respond to 
monetary policy isn't a concern to business cycle researchers. The converse of this is not 
true. Sticky price theories imply that durable goods with flexible prices should comove 
negatively with employment. Our next simulation presents this case. 
                                                 
21 See Mankiw [1982]. 
22 Note that nominal interest rates rise after the monetary expansion. Most of this is due to anticipated 
inflation rather than changes in the real rate of return. In models with capital, increases in employment 
cause the marginal product of capital to rise. The link between the marginal product of capital and the real 
interest rate implies that in sticky price models with capital, real interest rates also have a strong tendency 
to rise (see Tobin [1955] and also Sargent [1987] chapter 3).    23
 
Flexible Durables Prices and Sticky Nondurables Prices 
Figure 3 shows the response of the model when only the nondurable good has 
sticky prices. Again, we consider a permanent increase in the money supply of 1%. This 
figure illustrates the two central results of our paper. First, even though the production of 
nondurables accounts for 75% of GDP, output barely changes after the money shock. 
GDP – and consequently aggregate employment – rises by only 0.1% in the quarter 
following the shock. Even though most prices in this economy are sticky, money is 
approximately neutral with respect to aggregate employment and aggregate output. The 
source of this neutrality is, of course, the comovement problem. Consumption rises by 
2.45% and production of durables falls by roughly 7% in the first quarter. 
  Notice that both the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate fall after the 
monetary expansion. Thus, even though durables are perceived as “interest sensitive” 
components of aggregate expenditure, the low interest rate does not increase demand for 
these goods enough to counteract the effect of the increased cost of producing durables. 
 
Sticky Durables Prices and Flexible Nondurables Prices 
To show that this result is not simply a consequence of having one sector with 
sticky prices and another sector with flexible prices we now consider the opposite case --
sticky durables prices and flexible nondurables prices. Recall that the durables industry is 
the smaller industry so only 25% of GDP has sticky prices in this case. Figure 4 shows 
impulse responses for the same 1% increase in the money supply.  
Even though durables (the sticky price goods) only make up 25% of GDP, output 
rises by 0.45%. The output response is almost five times greater than in the case with 
sticky nondurables prices. In fact, the increase in output is more than half of the increase 
when all prices were sticky. In addition, the comovement problem that was so 
pronounced in the first case is greatly alleviated. Although consumption falls by 0.45% in 
the first quarter, durable goods production rises by 3.18 percent. This is much closer to 
the behavior we see in the data.
23  
                                                 
23 Recall that following a Romer date, nondurable consumption rises slightly.   24
This “reverse” experiment shows that aggregate output and employment respond 
to money shocks only if the durable goods sector has sticky prices. Very flexible durable 
goods prices result in approximate monetary neutrality even if the nondurables prices are 
very sluggish. However, the opposite is not true. Money is not neutral if nondurables 
prices are flexible but durables prices are sticky. 
 
Sensitivity 
Figure 5 plots the first quarter response of output to a shock as we vary the share 
of the sticky price sector. The solid line represents the model when durables prices are 
sticky. The dashed line is for the model with sticky prices for the nondurables sector.
24 
As the figure shows, the responses of the economy depend importantly on which sector 
has sticky prices. Not surprisingly, as the share of sticky price sectors falls, the output 
response gets smaller. When the sticky price goods are nondurables, however, the output 
response falls drastically as we reduce the fraction of sticky price sectors in GDP. Even 
when 80% of GDP has sticky prices, the output response is less that 20% of the response 
when all prices are sticky. In contrast, when the durables have sticky prices the fall in the 
output response is much less severe. Even when only 20% of GDP has sticky prices, the 
response of output is still half of what it is when all prices are sticky. We get greater 
increases in output and employment when 10% of GDP are durables with sticky prices 
than when 90% of GDP are nondurables with sticky prices. The message of this 
experiment is clear: in an economy with durable goods, sticky prices are important only if 
some durable goods have sticky prices.  
How many durable goods sectors need to have sticky prices? To address this 
question we run the same experiments on a four-sector variation of our basic model. 
There are two sectors that produce durables: one with sticky prices and one with flexible 
prices. There are also two sectors that produce nondurables: one sticky and one flexible. 
This allows us to vary the fraction of durable goods with sticky prices without changing 
the total fraction of goods that are durable.      
                                                 
24 Because we are changing the share of durables in GDP and because the production of durables is 
inherently more volatile than for nondurables, we normalized the lines by the response when all of GDP 
consists of either the durable or the nondurable good. The non-normalized graph looks similar.    25
Because small deviations in the relative price of the durable goods will usher forth 
very large swings in production of the two durable goods, we restrict the extent to which 
labor can move across sectors. To do this we assume that the disutility of leisure is given 
by: 
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Here, the ratios,  1
jc
i φφ govern the ratio of production of sector i,j where i = 1,2 indicates 
whether the sector has flexible prices or sticky prices and j = c,d indicates whether the 
good is a nondurable (c) or a durable (d) (the remaining free parameter φ 1
c  is normalized 






Nn == ∑  in the steady state). The aggregate 
elasticity of labor supply is controlled by η  while the degree to which labor can move 
across sectors is controlled by ζ . If ζ  = 0 then labor is completely mobile across the 
sectors. As ζ  increases, the extent to which labor can freely flow from one sector to the 
next is inhibited. When ζ  = 1, labor supply is additively separable across sectors and the 
sectors are fully insulated from each other. In the limit as µ→∞ , no sector can expand 
unless the others also expand. 
  Figure 6 graphs the first quarter responses of aggregate output (and employment) 
to a permanent (1%) increase in the money supply. The left-hand-side figures show what 
happens as we slowly change the fraction of durable goods that are sticky holding the 
fraction of sticky nondurables industries fixed. Each line represents a different fixed 
fraction of the nondurables industries with sticky prices (i.e. 25% means that 25% of 
nondurable consumption sectors have prices that are sticky). The right hand side figures 
show the same experiment as we vary the fraction of sticky price nondurable industries 
holding the fraction of sticky durables sectors fixed.  
 When  ζ  = .001, there is a great deal of labor mobility across sectors. In this case, 
increasing the fraction of durable goods with sticky prices increases the first quarter 
increase in employment regardless of how many nondurables goods have sticky prices. In 
contrast, increasing the fraction of nondurable goods with sticky prices does not   26
contribute as much to the change in employment. With ζ  = .001, the response of 
employment depends heavily on the fraction of durable goods with sticky prices.  
For higher values of ζ  (so that labor is less mobile) the fraction of nondurables 
with sticky prices is more and more important. Because labor cannot easily flow from 
one sector to another, increased production in sticky price industries is achieved by 
extending the hours of workers in that sector. When ζ  = 1, if all durable goods have 
flexible prices while all nondurables have sticky prices then employment rises by .6% in 
the first quarter; this is roughly 75% of the first quarter response when all goods had 
sticky prices in the standard New Keynesian model. Note that when there isn’t much 
price rigidity in the nondurable industries (say less than 25% of the nondurables have 
sticky prices), having some rigidity in the durables industries is very important. Even 
though the durables sectors are a relatively small part of GDP, they are a very important 
determinant of aggregate dynamics. 
Finally, figure 7 shows the first quarter response of employment in the model with 
flexible durables prices as we vary the rate at which the durable depreciates. As we would 
expect, when the good is more long-lived, the stock/flow distinction is sharper and our 
neutrality approximation works well. If the depreciation rate is .03 per year (which is 
comparable to the depreciation rate for houses), employment increases by less that 
5/100ths of a percent in the quarter following the shock. On the other hand, if the 
depreciation rate is .50 per year then the first quarter employment response is greater than 
0.25%.  
 
7. Resolving the Comovement Problem: 
The comovement problem is a consequence of equation (4.1). This equation 
equates the supply and demand for labor in an industry that produces durable goods with 
flexible prices. There are two basic ways to resolving the comovement problem. One way 
would be to assume that there are forces that influence the demand (γ ) or the supply (v’ 
and MP
N) of durables. Alternatively, it could be that equation (4.1) simply does not hold. 
In this section, we consider some natural modifications to our model and ask whether 
they might be part of a solution to eliminate negative comovement.  
   27
Immobile Labor  
One feature of the model above is that labor is homogeneous and can move freely 
across sectors. This means that there is one aggregate labor supply curve governed by 
v’(Nt). If aggregate employment rises then costs will rise in durables sector. This 
argument does not work when there are separate labor supply curves for each industry. 
Industry-specific labor supply curves insulate sectors from rising costs in other areas of 
the economy and as a result might be important in mitigating the co-movement problem.  
  Consider a modification of the model to allow for separate labor supply 
relationships. Utility is given by: 
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where Njt is labor supplied in sector j at time t and Φ  is an aggregator. Previously we 
assumed that Φ  was simply a convex function v(.) of the sum of the Njt. To keep things 
simple take Φ  to be a sum of convex functions  () ∑ = Φ
j jt j N v . This effectively isolates 
each sector’s labor supply pool (there is no substitution of labor at all across the 
industries).  
  Now, increased employment in other sectors during a monetary expansion will 
drive up the cost of producing only those goods. The pressure on labor markets in other 
sectors will have no affect on the supply of labor in flexible price sectors. The labor 
market clearing condition in a durable sector with flexible prices is now: 
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where the second equality again follows from durability (resulting in a constant marginal 
utility γ j ) and price flexibility (giving the constant markup µ j). This is one equation in the 
one unknown Njt. Thus, in the extreme case of no labor mobility at all across sectors, 
durable goods with flexible prices will not respond at all to monetary shocks. To the   28
extent that there is any labor mobility across sectors, durable goods sectors with flexible 
prices will contract after a monetary expansion. 
When factors are totally bound to one sector or another, durable goods sectors 
will not vary with the business cycle. Thus, although frictions in labor reallocation help to 
alleviate the co-movement problem, they cannot solve it. The best this modification can 
do is to render the durables sector acyclical.  
 
Complementarities.  
Complementarities and externalities can influence demand and/or costs. To the 
extent that the sticky price sectors increase production following a monetary expansion, 
positive spillovers may increase the demand for durables sufficiently to resolve the 
comovement problem. If the marginal utility of durable consumption rises with increases 
in the consumption of nondurables then γ  will rise with the expansion of production in the 
nondurables sector.  
While a high degree of complementarity sounds promising on its face, there are 
two problems with this type of demand spillover. First, recall that γ  is the discounted sum 
of marginal contributions to utility from an acquiring an additional unit of the durable 
good:  
() ()() () ()
2 2
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where we now allow for explicit dependence of the marginal utility on another 
consumption good (a nondurable) cit. Because monetary shocks raise production of 
nondurables temporarily, only the first few terms of this sum can be affected by the 
complementarity. Unless the complementarity is very strong, the percentage change in γ , 
and as a result, the increased incentive to produce additional durable goods, will be small.  
Second, complementarities between durables and nondurables tie the 
consumption (and production) of nondurables to the stock of durable goods. If the stock 
of the durable cannot rise quickly, then, modest amounts of demand complementarities 
will reduce the incentive to produce the nondurable good. This is a side effect of a 
demand complementarity. While it can potentially reduce the degree of negative   29
comovement in the durables sector, it also reduces the procyclicality of the associated 
nondurable sector.  
Figure 8 shows three simulations of the benchmark model (with flexible durables 
prices). The top panel is our benchmark model. As we saw before, output does not 
change in response to monetary stimulus, durable goods production falls and nondurable 
production rises. The middle panel shows the same model with a high degree of 
complementarity between durable consumption and nondurable consumption. 
Specifically, we set the elasticity of substitution between durables and nondurables to ρ  = 
0.1. As before, output is still approximately neutral. Durable goods production does not 
fall by as much as it did before, while production of the nondurable still increases but by 
much less. The bottom panel shows an extreme case of complementarity. We set the 
elasticity of substitution between durables and nondurables to ρ  = 0.01 . At this point, the 
comovement problem begins to go away. However, the neutrality that was previously 
confined to aggregate employment and GDP has now spread to each sector individually. 
Put differently, because the durable has a low depreciation rate, a high degree of 
complementarity strengthens the neutrality result. 
Another form of complementarity arises if the durable is productive capital. If 
employment rises following a monetary expansion, the marginal product of capital also 
rises, which increases the demand for capital. The more aggregate employment responds 
to monetary shocks, the more this complementarity will stimulate investment spending. 
As with the previous form of demand spillover, this mechanism requires a significant and 
prolonged increase in employment. If monetary business cycles are short-lived, then, as 
before, the increased payoff to capital will be short-lived and γ  will rise only slightly.   
Externalities and complementarities that lower costs of production have more 
potential to resolve the comovement problem than do demand spillovers. Labor supply 
complementarity is one example of such an effect. If labor supply and the consumption of 
nondurables are complementary, then increased production of nondurables, shifts out the 
labor supply curve, reducing costs. If this effect is strong enough, it could raise   30
production in the durables sectors.
25 In general, any spillover effect that lowers costs in 
the durables sector could potentially increase the production of durables. It is easier to 
argue that spillovers mitigate the comovement problem by lowering costs than to claim 
that they provide a rationale for increased demand for durables.   
 
Credit Constraints and the Financial Accelerator  
The other way to attack the comovement problem is simply to consider models in 
which equation (4.1) does not hold. One way to break equation (4.1) is to assume that 
people who buy new houses are constrained in their ability to make purchases. For 
consumers who are credit constrained, 
d
tt P γ λ >  and as a result (4.1) is not an equality.  
More specifically, suppose that the demand for durables is primarily composed of 
people who need to borrow to acquire the durable. Furthermore, assume that many of 
these people face binding borrowing constraints. These customers would like to borrow 
against their future income to buy more durable goods but they are up against their 
borrowing constraint. For these customers, 
d
tt t P γ λ > . This breaks the link in the 
benchmark model between the marginal utility of an extra durable and its price. A model 
with this feature might not display the comovement problem. Assuming that income rises 
in the wake of a monetary shock, agents who face binding credit constraints may spend 
their additional income on durable goods even if nondurable goods become relatively 
cheaper.  
Many models imply that the severity of borrowing constraints is inversely related 
to cash flow or collateral (the financial accelerator hypothesis). For example, an 
improvement in income or employment status can have a substantial effect on the size of 
the mortgage for which a buyer can qualify. Extra income plays two roles in such a 
model. In addition to the effect in the previous paragraph, additional income will also 
relax the borrowing constraint. Both of these effects make the demand for durables 
depend on income (GDP) rather than the aggregate stock of durables.  
 
                                                 
25 If labor supply is complementary with the stock of durables then, because the stock of durables is 
roughly constant, aggregate employment will remain roughly constant. This may even reinforce the 
neutrality result and exacerbate the comovement problem.   31
Sticky Wages and Input Prices. 
When inputs into production have sticky prices, the final good will behave as 
though its price was somewhat sticky even if the final seller can set prices freely.
26 This 
may be why some durables (and some nondurables) industries expand production in 
response to an increase in the money supply even if it is believed that their prices are 
completely flexible. The final price of new housing could be perfectly flexible but if 
wages of construction workers are sticky, then housing will still expand following a 
monetary expansion. If wages are sticky, then equation (4.1) does not hold. Workers are 
“off their labor supply curves” and as a result do not equate the marginal disutility of 
work to the marginal benefit of working more.  
To make this point formally, we modify our two-sector model to allow for sticky 
wages. We follow Erceg, Henderson and Levin [2000] by modeling wage rigidity as a 
third Calvo process. Specifically, we assume that effective labor for the firms is an 
aggregate of labor “types”. Specifically, if Lt is effective labor at time t we have:  
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− −  =   ∫  (7.2) 













where wages for each worker type are set by monopolists that seek to maximize the 
utility of the representative household taking the demand for their type as given. The 
aggregate wage is:  
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−   =     ∫  (7.4) 
Let θ w be the probability that an arbitrary monopolist cannot reset the wage in any 
period. Then, arguments similar to those in the sticky price section give us a wage setting 











  =− + − − + +    
 
% %% % %%  (7.5) 
                                                 
26 Note that in the simulated models, we assume that the primary source of stickiness in the final goods 
prices does come from sticky intermediate goods prices.    32
  ()
*
1 1 tw t w t WW w θθ − =+ − %% %  (7.6) 
where Wt is the aggregate wage rate and 
*
t w  is the optimal “reset wage” for unions that 
have the opportunity to change their wage rate.  
Figure 9.a shows the impulse response function for the two sector model to a 
permanent 1% increase in the money supply under the assumption that wages are reset on 
average once per quarter. The comovement problem is greatly mitigated; in the first 
quarter durable goods production rises by 1.97%. Still, durable goods production remains 
below its benchmark level for the year. In quarters two, three and four, the production of 
durables is below steady state by –0.29%, –1.00%, and –1.02% respectively. Figure 9.b 
shows the same model under the assumption that wages are reset on average once every 
six months.
27  The comovement problem is now essentially gone. Durable goods 
production is above trend in the first two quarters by 2.8% and 1.3% respectively. It does 
fall below trend in the fourth quarter but only by 0.08%. The assumption that wages are 
reset only once every six months does not sound like an implausibly high degree of wage 
rigidity. If wages are at least this rigid then nominal wage rigidity might be a very 




Sticky price models exhibit strongly counterfactual behavior when they include 
markets for durable goods with flexible prices. Consumers care about the stock of durable 
goods rather than the flow of purchases. Because the timing and magnitude of durables 
purchases can be varied considerably without noticeable changes in the stock, purchases 
of durable goods have an inherently high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When 
the economy expands, marginal costs rise throughout the economy. Firms that have 
sticky prices simply produce to meet demand for their products. However, in the absence 
of offsetting increases in demand for their products, firms with flexible prices respond to 
the higher marginal cost by reducing production. High marginal cost combined with a 
                                                 
27 This is still less rigidity than our benchmark setting for price rigidity; a six month half life corresponds to 
resetting prices, on average, roughly 1.4 times per year.   33
readiness to bunch the production and purchase of durables means that when the rest of 
the economy expands, durable goods sectors with flexible prices should contract.   
Sticky price models do not exhibit sufficiently powerful cyclical effects on the 
desired stock of durables to offset the very strong tendency for agents to substitute 
purchases over time. Standard sticky price models require significant additional features 
if they are to permit durables with flexible prices and still match the central features of 
the data. To this end, wage rigidity and borrowing constraints may be valuable features to 
add to existing models.  
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th Order Autocorrelation: 
Lag k:   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
CPI   0.73  0.69  0.71  0.60  0.55  0.51  0.45  0.35  0.37  0.35  0.31  0.30 
Nondurables CPI    0.41  0.46  0.46  0.32  0.28  0.26  0.23  0.08  0.14  0.09  0.08  0.05 
Durables CPI  0.66  0.58  0.64  0.49  0.46  0.50  0.41  0.39  0.45  0.35  0.33  0.31 
Automobiles CPI  0.26  0.19  0.14  0.25  0.31  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.21  0.20  0.11  0.04 
Avg House Price  -0.37  0.21  -0.08  0.04  0.12  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.08  0.05  0.01  -0.06 
Med House Price  -0.37  0.09  0.06  0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.05  -0.04  0.02  0.06  -0.07  0.00 
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Figure 6: The First Quarter Increase in Employment  
As the Fraction of Goods with Sticky Prices Changes 
Fixed Fraction of Nondurables
with Sticky Prices           
Fixed Fraction of Durables 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9.b : Sticky Wages and Flexible Durable Goods Prices  